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In this paper, we analyze model risks separately in pricing models
and risk measurement models as follows. (1) In pricing models,
model risk is defined as “the risk arising from the use of a model
which cannot accurately evaluate market prices, or which is not a
mainstream model in the market.” (2) In risk measurement models,
model risk is defined as “the risk of not accurately estimating the
probability of future losses.” Based on these definitions, we examine
various specific cases and numerical examples to determine the
sources of model risks and to discuss possible steps to control these
risks.
Sources of model risk in pricing models include (1) use of wrong
assumptions, (2) errors in estimations of parameters, (3) errors
resulting from discretization, and (4) errors in market data. On the
other hand, sources of model risk in risk measurement models include
(1) the difference between assumed and actual distribution, and (2)
errors in the logical framework of the model.
Practical steps to control model risks from a qualitative perspec-
tive include improvement of risk management systems (organization,
authorization, human resources, etc.). From a quantitative perspec-
tive, in the case of pricing models, we can set up a reserve to allow
for the difference in estimations using alternative models. In the case
of risk measurement models, scenario analysis can be undertaken for
various fluctuation patterns of risk factors, or position limits can be
established based on information obtained from scenario analysis.
Key words: Model risk; Pricing model; Risk measurement model;
Risk management systems; Reserves; Scenario analy-
sis; Position limitsI. Introduction
There has been an explosive growth in financial derivative products in recent years.
In the case of Japan, a similar rush to develop new derivative products is expected
with the implementation of the Financial Big Bang. Complex financial products
require sophisticated financial engineering capabilities for proper risk control, includ-
ing accurate valuation, hedging, and risk measurement. Parallel to the creation of
more diverse financial products and the development of new markets for such prod-
ucts, both pricing models and risk measurement models used as risk management
tools have also become increasingly complex. Recently, several major financial institu-
tions have reported losses arising from the use of such complex models. This has
drawn attention to the various types of risk which result from the use of such models.
Generally speaking, the use of models can carry various types of risks.
1 In this
paper, however, we specify model risks as follows. In pricing models, model risk is
defined as “the risk arising from the use of a model which cannot accurately evaluate
market prices, or which is not a mainstream model in the market.” In risk measure-
ment models, model risk is defined as “the risk of not accurately estimating the prob-
ability of future losses.” Hence, such types of risk as market price input errors, and
bugs remaining in software in the model-building stage are excluded from our analy-
sis.
Among possible sources of model risk, there has been a great deal of discussion
regarding the volatility smile (hereinafter referred to as “smile”) and the treatment of
the distribution of underlying asset prices.
2 For instance, the Black-Scholes model
3
(hereinafter referred to as the “BS model”), a standard pricing model for options,
assumes that underlying asset prices fluctuate according to a lognormal process,
whereas actual market price fluctuations do not necessarily follow this process. 
However, as pointed out by Kato and Yoshiba (1999), many market players con-
tinue to use the BS model as a pricing tool with full knowledge of its limitations.
Moreover, models have become indispensable tools in the development of new finan-
cial products and the management of their risks. In view of this, market players no
longer have the choice of terminating the use of models on the grounds of existing
model risks. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the sources of model risks and to dis-
cuss possible steps to control their risks. The paper is organized as follows. Chapter II
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1. For example, Derman (1996) refers to the following types of model risk.
- Inapplicability of modelling
- Incorrect model
- Correct model, incorrect solution
- Correct model, inappropriate use
- Badly approximated solution
- Software and hardware bugs
- Unstable data
2. Simons (1997) states that analysis of underlying asset prices and evaluation of smile are vitally important in risk
management.  Jorion (1999) argues that one of the causal factors in the failure of Long-Term Capital
Management (hereinafter referred to as LTCM) was an inappropriate assumption concerning the distribution of
underlying asset price fluctuations.
3. See Appendix 1 for details of the Black-Scholes model.presents some cases of model risks which have actually been realized. Numerical
examples are examined in the following three chapters. Specifically, Chapter III treats
long-term foreign exchange options; Chapter IV discusses barrier options on stock
price; and Chapter V treats interest-rate strangle short strategies. Based on the impli-
cations gained from these analyses, Chapter VI examines available methods for man-
aging model risks. Finally, Chapter VII briefly outlines some conclusions. 
II. Cases of Realized Model Risks 
When are model risks realized?  One such case may occur when a financial institu-
tion revises its internal pricing model and registers a loss by changing its valuation of
current prices.  Such reports of the realization of model risks are occasionally heard
from the market.  While details of the causal factors in such cases are not made pub-
lic, in this chapter, we present an outline of these cases based on media reports.
4
A. Case of Index Swap
Index swaps are swap transactions in which floating interest rates are based on indices
other than LIBOR. As such, Nikkei index-linked swaps fall under this category.  In
the case of index swaps, it is necessary to manage the position and the risks in line
with the relevant index. This requires a full understanding of various types of indices,
as well as the structure of index swap markets.  
A certain financial institution accumulated a substantial position in a special type
of index swap.  At the time, the market participants were using several types of mod-
els for the valuation of this index swap. This financial institution began trading in
this product using what was recognized at the time as the leading mainstream model.
As the market for this index swap shrank, some participants left the market.
Thereafter, another model, which was being used by some of the remaining partici-
pants, became the dominant model in the market.
While maintaining a very large position in this swap index, this financial institu-
tion fell behind in research of the most dominant pricing model for this product in
the market. Consequently, it failed to recognize that a switch had been made in the
dominant model until adjusting its position. As a result, it registered losses amount-
ing to several billion yen when it finally adopted the new model and made the neces-
sary adjustments in its current price valuations.
B. Case of Mark Cap
Caps
5 are a form of interest rate options and generally constitute an OTC product
with relatively high liquidity.  The broker screen displays the implied volatility for
each strike price and time period as calculated for cap prices using the BS model.
This volatility exhibits certain skew structures (hereinafter referred to as “skew”) by
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4. Cases cited in this section have been expressly selected for the purpose of presenting a more concrete image of
model risks, and may include the authorís conjectures.
5. See Kato and Yoshiba (1999) for more on interest rate cap and skew structure.strike price and by time period.  To calculate the current price of any given cap, the
volatility corresponding to the time period and strike price of the cap is first esti-
mated (interpolated) on the basis of the skew which is normally observed in the mar-
ket.
A certain financial institution was engaged in Deutsche mark cap transactions.  At
the time, the number of time periods and strike prices for which volatility could be
confirmed on the screen was relatively small compared to yen caps.  The estimation
of volatility was particularly difficult for caps with significant differences between
market interest rates and strike interest rates (hereinafter referred to as “far-out
strikes”).  
The financial institution was using the BS model as its internal pricing model for
caps.  This institution uses the broker-screen volatility of the closest strike price as the
volatility of far-out strikes.  Some cap dealers attempted to capitalize on the
inevitable difference between market prices and valuation prices by trading aggres-
sively in far-out strikes.  This strategy generated internal valuation profits.
The financial institution fell behind in improving its pricing model and failed to
minimize the gap between market prices and valuation prices.  Continued cap dealer
transactions under an unimproved model resulted in the accumulation of substantial
internal valuation profits.  However, when the internal pricing model was finally
revised, the financial institution reported several tens of billion yen in losses. 
C. Case of Credit Spread Position Held by LTCM
LTCM had accumulated a highly leveraged credit spread position which combined
emerging bonds, loans, and other instruments.  The position was structured to gener-
ate profits as spreads narrowed.  LTCM suffered huge losses as a result of the sudden
increase in spreads following the Russian crisis in 1998.
Various reasons have been given for these huge losses.  For instance, LTCM was
unable to hedge or cancel its transactions because its liquidity had dried up in the
market.  On this point, it has been said that LTCM had not taken liquidity into
account when building its model.  Others have pointed to internal problems in
LTCM’s risk measurement model.  Specifically, problems with wrong assumptions
concerning the distribution of underlying asset prices and errors in data used in esti-
mating the distribution of underlying asset prices have been pointed out.  Both
would lead to fatal errors in risk measurement (Jorion [1999]). 
D. Summary
The critical points in the model risks described above can be outlined as follows:
- declining market liquidity and obsolescence of pricing models,
- trader transactions capitalizing on the difference between market prices and prices
calculated by pricing models, and
- wrong assumptions concerning the distribution of underlying asset prices and errors
in data used in estimation.
The above cases indicate that very large losses can result when improvement of
internal models is neglected, or when organizational mechanisms for undertaking the
necessary improvements fail.
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Several cases of the realization of model risks were discussed in Chapter II.  In
Chapters III through V, model risks shall be more closely examined using numerical
examples.  This exercise shall start in this chapter with the analysis of long-term for-
eign exchange options.
Figure 1 presents the volatility of yen/dollar exchange rates and yen interest rates
at end-of-month as announced by the Japanese Bankers Association.
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Figure 1 Volatility in Foreign Exchange Options (Telerate Co. as of October 29, 1999)
“Option volatility” appearing in Figure 1 presents the option volatility for time
periods (“Term”) of less than one year, as calculated using the BS model.  For the
given day of October 29, 1999, it can be seen that the volatility structure is such that
volatility increases as the period of the transaction is extended, going from 13.71%
for a one-month transaction to 15.05% for a one-year transaction.  “ATM FWD”
appearing in the same figure refers to at-the-money (hereinafter referred to as
“ATM”) forward transactions.  This indicates the volatility of options using the for-
ward foreign exchange rate of the pertinent period as the strike price.
6
As shown in Figure 1, volatility for periods exceeding one year are not given.  This
is because foreign exchange options rarely exceed one year, and the transaction
amount is very small even when they do.  This can be explained as follows.  First of
all, as compared to short-term options, long-term foreign exchange options consti-
tute high-risk products because premiums become increasingly sensitive to volatility
as the maturity is prolonged.  Secondly, because the market for long-term foreign
exchange options is not very liquid, in certain cases a deal cannot be quickly closed.
Finally, as pointed out by Derman [1996] and as can be confirmed from Figure 1,
6. In actual OTC foreign exchange option transactions, the volatility of the smile is also taken into consideration.
MONTHLY INFORMATION
* OPTION VOLATILITY * *** JPY INTEREST RATE ***
ATM FWD (360 DAYS BASE)
[  TERM  ] [  RATE  ] [  TERM  ] [  RATE  ] [  TERM  ] [  RATE  ]
1 MONTH 13.71 1 MONTH 0.04 2  YEAR 0.38
2 MONTH 13.96 2 MONTH 0.39 3  YEAR 0.63
3 MONTH 14.32 3 MONTH 0.33 4  YEAR 0.95
4 MONTH 14.48 4 MONTH 0.27 5  YEAR 1.28
5 MONTH 14.64 5 MONTH 0.26 7  YEAR 1.81
6 MONTH 14.81 6 MONTH 0.26 10 YEAR 2.28
9 MONTH 14.92 9 MONTH 0.26
1  YEAR 15.05 1  YEAR 0.26
[ PROVIDED BY KYODO NEWS ] [  CONTINUED ON PAGE 35303  ]
05/11 2.44 GMT [  JAPAN BANKER'S ASSOCIATION — (3)  ] 35302
[  OCT 29, ‘99  ]the BS model’s assumption of constant interest rates and volatility is not realistic, par-
ticularly when the term of the transaction is relatively long.  As such, the valuation of
long-term foreign exchange options presents difficult problems and is especially sus-
ceptible to model risks.
A. Amin-Jarrow Model
7
Amin and Jarrow [1999] have developed a foreign exchange option model which
treats two-country interest rates and foreign exchange rates as variables.  Table 1 com-
pares the premiums on long-term yen/dollar foreign exchange options (call options)
exceeding one year (notional amount: 105.71 yen/dollar) as calculated using the
Amin-Jarrow model (hereinafter referred to as the “AJ model”) and the BS model as
of October 15, 1999.
8 Note that the value of the correlation coefficient used in Table
1 for the yen/dollar exchange rate and the dollar interest rate (0.05) was obtained
from historical data.
Strike prices are given in the left-hand column of Table 1, and corresponding pre-
miums are indicated by option maturity.  For example, for a strike price of 105.71
yen/dollar (spot rate for October 15, 1999), the five-year maturity premium was 5.48
yen/dollar and 5.49 yen/dollar for the AJ model and BS model, respectively.  The
largest observed difference in premiums for the two models was 0.08 yen/dollar
(158.57 yen/dollar strike price with five-year maturity).  This difference was equiva-
lent to approximately 10% of the premiums (0.87 yen/dollar and 0.95 yen/dollar), or
only 0.076% of the notional amount.  At this level, the difference can be readily con-
tained in the bid-offer spread of volatility.  In other words, the calculated values of
the two models are very close to each other.
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7. See Appendix 2 for details of the Amin-Jarrow model.
8. Data used in the analysis consists of: yen/dollar exchange rate, and term structures of dollar and yen interest rates
of October 15, 1999; and yen/dollar exchange rate, and variance and covariance of dollar and yen interest rates
from October 2, 1998 to October 15, 1999 (historical data for approximately one year).  In this analysis, histori-
cal volatility was used.  Although it is desirable to use implied volatility, historical volatility was used for the fol-
lowing reasons: because of low liquidity in long-term foreign exchange option markets, it is difficult to obtain
implied volatility; and the present chapter focuses on differences in numerical results among various models.
Table 1 Comparison of Premiums (¥/$) in AJ model and BS model
(Call Option for October 15, 1999)
Strike AJ model Years BS model Years
price 1234512345
158.57 0.05 0.26 0.50 0.70 0.87 0.05 0.27 0.52 0.75 0.95
148.00 0.14 0.50 0.83 1.08 1.27 0.14 0.51 0.85 1.13 1.34
137.43 0.37 0.95 1.35 1.64 1.85 0.37 0.96 1.38 1.68 1.91
126.86 0.95 1.75 2.20 2.48 2.67 0.96 1.76 2.22 2.52 2.71
116.29 2.28 3.14 3.52 3.73 3.84 2.28 3.15 3.54 3.75 3.86
105.71 4.95 5.45 5.55 5.54 5.48 4.96 5.46 5.57 5.56 5.49
95.14 9.67 9.10 8.57 8.15 7.78 9.68 9.11 8.59 8.16 7.78
84.57 16.80 14.46 12.92 11.82 10.95 16.80 14.47 12.93 11.82 10.94
74.00 25.95 21.70 18.84 16.80 15.23 25.95 21.71 18.86 16.82 15.23
63.43 36.16 30.61 26.44 23.31 20.86 36.16 30.62 26.45 23.33 20.86
52.86 46.67 40.59 35.47 31.34 27.95 46.67 40.59 35.48 31.35 27.96Given a strike price of 105.71 yen/dollar and a five-year maturity, Figure 2 depicts
how premiums change in accordance with the correlation coefficient
9 for the yen/dol-
lar exchange rate and the dollar interest rate.  
In the case of the AJ model, the premium is diminished as the correlation coeffi-
cient approaches 1.  Figure 2 indicates that the difference in premiums exceeds 20%
when comparisons are made at correlation values of 0.05 and 1 (equivalent to a dif-
ference of slightly less than 1% in notional amount).
The differences in the calculated values of the AJ model and BS model were small
in Table 1 because the correlation between the yen/dollar foreign exchange rate and
the dollar interest rate was assumed to be fixed at 0.05.  It should be noted that in
the case of the BS model, the premium remains constant because the correlation
coefficient is not incorporated into the model (Figure 2).  Therefore, if the BS model
is applied to long-term foreign exchange options, there is a risk of major mis-pricing
at certain levels of correlation between exchange and interest rates.
B. Implications
The AJ model is a relatively detailed model which takes account of the term struc-
tures of interest rates and volatility, the correlation of interest rates and foreign
exchange rates, and the fluctuation of these values over time.  Thus, the AJ model is
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9. Premiums were calculated based on estimations of the parameters of the AJ model for the given correlation coef-
ficient.
Figure 2 Relation of Correlation Coefficient and Premiums in AJ Model
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Correlation coefficient between yen/dollar exchange rates and dollar interest rates
Premium
BS model: 5.49based on more realistic assumptions than the BS model.  Therefore, in the valuation
of long-term foreign exchange options, it is more desirable to use the AJ model than
the BS model.
However, in the case of long-term foreign exchange options, not only is it difficult
to obtain the market price, but there is no guarantee that actual transactions can be
carried out at the current price calculated using the model.  Moreover, there is a high
risk of mis-pricing caused by wrong estimation of the parameters.
IV. Barrier Options on Stock Price
This chapter is given to the analysis of barrier options (barrier options on stock
price), an exotic option with a complicated structure.
Stock prices are generally subject to higher levels of volatility than foreign
exchange rates and bonds.  In addition, stock prices tend to clearly exhibit volatility
structures, such as skews and smiles.  Figure 3 presents the volatility structure of
OTC options of the Nikkei Stock Average index (five types of days to maturity).
10
The relative error (in percent) between the underlying asset price on a given day
and the strike price is measured on the horizontal axis of Figure 3, while the vertical
axis measures the volatility corresponding to the plain call option or put option
(hereinafter referred to as the “normal option”) at the given strike price.  The skew
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10. Premiums are used for indications of OTC stock index options.  In Figure 3, implied volatility was calculated
using the BS model based on the indications of the Traditional Co.
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Strike price (Relative error to underlying asset price)
Volatility
71 162 253 344 435 Days to maturitystructure of stock options is generally such that volatility is higher for options with a
lower strike price, and lower for options with a higher strike price.  Similarly, the
skew structure of options closer to maturity is more steeply sloped than options with
longer maturity.  Figure 3 confirms these features of the skew structure.
To properly value the current price of stock index options and to manage the risk,
it is necessary to use models which conform to market data.  However, as in the case
of foreign exchange options, the BS model is widely used.  This choice is based on
the fact that almost all market transactions in options constitute normal option trans-
actions.
In the case of such exotic options as barrier options, it is clearly dangerous to use
the volatility of normal options for valuation of current prices and risk management.
In the following section, barrier options are priced using the implied binomial tree
model (a type of lattice method), and the results are examined.
A. Implied Binomial Tree Model
11
Implied binomial tree models (hereinafter referred to as the “IBT model”) were
designed to facilitate more accurate pricing of the types of volatility skews and term
structures appearing in Figure 3.  The IBT model used in the numerical examples of
this chapter is from Derman and Kani (1994).
12 The lattice structures of the normal
binomial lattice model and the IBT model are shown in Figure 4.    
The lattice structure of IBT shown in Figure 4(b) is warped in comparison to the
lattice structure in Figure 4(a) representing the binomial tree derived by Cox, Ross,
and Rubinstein (1979).  Although IBT assumes the same risk neutrality as the nor-
mal binomial tree, its lattice structure is warped to achieve a higher level of confor-
mity with market data.
Using this IBT model, we analyze the “down and out put option” which is one
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11. See Appendix 3 for a summary of the implied binomial tree model.
12. The Derman and Kani (1994) model is sometimes referred to as the implied volatility tree.  See also Dupire
(1994) for details of the implied volatility tree.
Figure 4 Comparison of Lattice Structures
Rate of change in underlying asset prices Rate of change in underlying asset prices
Time Time
(a) Normal binomial tree (b) Implied binomial treetype of barrier option.  The down and out put option is an exotic type of option
wherein option rights are lost (the right to sell the underlying asset) if the barrier
price (hereinafter referred to as the “knock-out price”) is ever reached through matu-
rity.
13 The down and out put option is structured so that the rate of change in the
option price against the price of the underlying asset increases as the knock-out price
is approached.
Figure 5 compares down and out put option premiums calculated using the
results of a Black-Scholes type model (hereinafter referred to as the “BS-type”)
14 and
the IBT model.  The underlying asset price is 17,605.46 yen, and the knock-out
price is 15,000 yen.  BS-type (strike) premiums shown in the figure were calculated
by substituting volatility at strike price into the closed-form result of the BS-type,
while BS-type (knock-out) premiums were similarly calculated using the volatility of
the knock-out price.
Figure 5 indicates that IBT model premiums
15 are smaller than BS-type (knock-
out) premiums, and that IBT model premiums approach the BS-type (knock-out)
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13. Judgment on whether the barrier price has been reached may be based on intra-day price fluctuations, closing
prices, or end-of-week prices.
14. In this paper, “BS-type analytical results” refers to calculations carried out using an option model with the same
framework as the BS model.  See Appendix 1 for details.
15. All IBT model calculations in this chapter, excluding the calculations for Figure 6, are based on 30 lattice seg-
ments.
Figure 5 Comparison of Down and Out Put Option Premiums (1)






15,000 15,500 16,000 16,500 17,000 17,500 18,000
Strike price
Premium
IBTmodel BS-type (Strike) BS-type (Knock-out)
Maturity: 3 months
Knock-out price: 15,000 yenpremiums as the strike price rises. This is an interesting observation as it means that,
in comparison to the BS-type (knock-out), the IBT model assigns a greater weight to
the possibility of the underlying asset price reaching the knock-out price.
B. Problems of the IBT Model
As mentioned above, the IBT model has been structured to conform to market data.
On the other hand, various qualifications apply to the use of this model.  Figure 6
depicts the relation between the number of lattice segments and premiums in the
IBT model.
In the lattice method, as a rule, the calculated premiums are unstable when the
number of lattice segments is small.  Figure 6 shows that premiums become increas-
ingly stable as the number of segments is increased.  This observation applies to both
normal options and down and out put options.  Furthermore, a comparison of the
down and out put option and normal option reveals that the former requires a larger
number of segments for premiums to be stabilized.  
As shown in Figure 7, premiums calculated using the lattice approach take the
form of a discontinuous function in their relation to underlying asset prices.  This
discontinuity occurs for the following reason.  Under the lattice method, judgment
on knock-out of a down and out put option is made at a point located on the lattice.
Therefore, if the knock-out price is not located on the lattice, the calculated results
will be unstable.  It can be seen that there is a tendency for the instability to be larger
when the option is in-the-money.
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Strike price: 17,000 yen
Knock-out price: 15,000 yenFigure 7 depicts the modified IBT model
16 which was designed to overcome this
problem.  The modified model approximates the premium in the following manner.
Two points on the lattice lying on either side of a knock-out price are assumed to
represent knock-out prices and are used in calculating two option prices located on
the lattice.  Then, the difference between the closest price on the lattice and the
knock-out price is linearly apportioned to approximate the premium.
17 Figure 7 pre-
sents a comparison of down and out put option premiums calculated using the IBT
model and the modified IBT model.     
Figure 7 shows that the premiums calculated using the modified IBT model trace
a relatively smooth curve, indicating that this is an easy-to-use model from the per-
spective of position management.  However, compared to the BS-type (knock-out),
premiums are consistently lower and move in the range of 1/2 - 2/3.  This point dif-
fers significantly from the results observed in Figure 5.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the structures and computational processes of the
IBT model and modified IBT model can be characterized as follows.
- Calculated results are more compatible to the market than the BS model.
- Because these models are based on a discretized approach, the results are affected
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Figure 7 Comparison of Down and Out Put Option Premiums (2)















Strike price: 17,000 yen
Knock-out price: 15,000 yen
16. The modified IBT model is based on the procedures of Derman, Kani, Ergener, and Bardhan (1995).
17. The option price is adjusted as follows.  First, the option price of a point on the lattice is calculated on the
assumption that no barrier exits at the lattice-point prices located on either side of the knock-out price.  Next, the
distance (price difference) between the knock-out price and lattice-point price is linearly apportioned to the
option prices of each of the lattice points.  Following this process, the option prices on the two points on the lat-
tice are added together and used as the option price of the lattice point located between the two points.141
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by the discretized segments (number of segments).
- An increase in the number of segments dramatically increases the computational
burden.
- Reliability is low when market data is limited.
- The data handling burden is high, and discretionary factors cannot be removed.
C. Implications
The IBT model is designed for calculating current prices which conform to the mar-
ket, based on the prices of heavily traded financial products.  However, in reality, the
IBT model depends on approximations such as discretization and adjustments in bar-
rier prices.  Therefore, the IBT model may not necessarily arrive at the theoretically
correct current price.
The IBT model also carries the risk of calculating a price which may not conform
with the current price at any given time.  This risk arises from such considerations as
the time lag in obtaining market data, the timing of the data display output, and the
bid-offer spread.  Furthermore, as can be confirmed in Figure 3, a wide range of mar-
ket data cannot be obtained at all times, and interpolation processes are required in
numerous instances.  The IBT model may be particularly susceptible to the impact of
data interpolation.
V. Strangle Short Strategy
One of the available option strategies is a strangle short strategy.  A strangle consti-
tutes a combination of calls and puts with different strike prices.  (A combination of
calls and puts with the same strike price is called a straddle.)  The general objectives
of making a strangle position can be described as follows.  (1) Holders of options can
use strangles as a hedge against sharp swings in underlying asset prices, and (2) writ-
ers of options can use strangles to earn premiums expecting that the underlying asset
price may remain within the range of the window (the range of underlying asset price
whereby the put-call strike-price difference does not result in payment on maturity).
Figure 8 presents the profit-loss diagram of the strangle short position. 
Traders frequently take short positions to accommodate the hedging needs of cus-
tomers.
18 Moreover, some traders actively adopt a strangle short strategy featuring a
wide window to earn premiums.  
In this chapter, we shall measure the risks of strangle positions and examine some
pertinent problems.
A. Interest Rate Distribution
Figure 9 depicts the 10-day fluctuation histogram of a five-year swap rate.  The data
covers a period of approximately six years extending between November 1993 and
18. It is more common for traders to take short positions of options in order to act as counterparties to the hedging
needs of customers.  In Japan, it appears that it is not unusual for customers to take short positions with the aim
of earning premiums.  November 1999.  It can be seen from Figure 9 that the distribution of interest rate
fluctuations during this period differs from normal distribution which is generally
used in the value-at-risk method (hereinafter referred to as “VaR”).  The center of
gravity of the actual distribution observed during this period lies to the right of nor-
mal distribution (skewness = 0.28).  Moreover, the historical data exhibits a kurtosis
of five compared to three in the case of normal distribution.  Finally, the historical
data has a fat tail with the 99% points located at -0.41 and 0.43 (compared to 99%
points located at ±0.38 in the case of normal distribution).
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Figure 9 Distribution of Ten-Day Fluctuations of Five-Year Swap Rate
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asset priceB. Comparison of Risk Amount
A five-year swap rate is used as the underlying asset in the following example of a
strangle short strategy.  Let us assume that we have sold calls and puts with strike
prices of ±0.30% from the current interest rate level.  Let us further assume that the
transactions were made with ten business days remaining to maturity, and that we
hold the options through maturity.  Figure 10 and Table 2 present a histogram of
profits and losses registered if one unit of the same strangle short transaction had
been contracted on every business day between the second half of 1996 and the first
half of 1999.
19
Under this strangle short strategy, per unit profits amounted to 0.00 - +0.01 on
nearly 90% of all trading days, indicating a very high concentration of profit/loss dis-
tribution in an extremely narrow band.  Cumulative profit/loss for the entire period
amounted to a gain of +0.39.
20 The largest half-year gain was registered in the first
half of 1999 with a profit of +0.39, while the largest half-year loss was registered in
the second half of 1998 with a loss of -0.63.  The largest fluctuation in profit/loss
was observed during the second half of 1998.  Almost all of the over ±0.05 fluctua-
tions observed during the entire period  were concentrated in this half-year period.
Furthermore, the largest loss registered for a single transaction was also registered in
the second half of 1998 at -0.23.
Next, the relationship between profit/loss under this strangle short strategy and
VaR is shown in Figure 11.
After marking a brief climb in 1994, the five-year yen-swap rate generally contin-
ued to move downward until reversing itself in the second half of 1998.  Thereafter,
it has fluctuated in a relatively narrow band around 1%.  Figure 11 shows that the
profit/loss of the strangle short strategy adopted in this chapter fluctuated signifi-
cantly when the trend in interest rates was reversed.  Particularly large and continu-
ous fluctuations were observed during the second half of 1998.  On the other hand,
fluctuations were small throughout the remainder of the period.
VaR shown in Figure 11 was calculated using the scenario method and the histori-
cal simulation method.
21 Normal distribution was assumed for VaR (one year) and
VaR (three years), and calculations were based on the worst-case scenario of the 99%
(2.33 σ ) confidence level of the historical volatility for the latest one- and three-year
periods, respectively.
22 On the other hand, the 99% point of the historical simulation
method was calculated for VaR (HS: one year) and VaR (HS: three years) based on
historical data for the latest one- and three-year periods.  Because the volatility of the
five-year swap rate continuously declined after interest rates began to climb in 1994,
VaR (one year) and VaR (three years), which both assume normal distribution, traced
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19. We assumed that we were able to sell both the call and put options based on a BS model with historical volatility
of the ten immediately preceding days with zero drift.  (In reality, we could probably have received a higher pre-
mium because of the existence of a smile in the market.)  Note that in this chapter we are analyzing an option in
which the five-year swap rate itself is the underlying asset.
20. Reinvestment of profits is not taken into account here.
21. Standard methods for calculation of VaR of options are (1) the delta + gamma + vega method, (2) the scenario
method, and (3) the simulation method.  Because (1) presents various problems for VaR measurement, (2) and
(3) were used in this analysis.
22. Calculations are based on one year = 250 business days, and three years = 750 business days.144 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 2000
Figure 10 Profit and Loss of Interest Rate Strangle Short Strategy
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Table 2 Profit and Loss for Interest Rate Strangle Short Strategy
(Per Period: October 1, 1996 - September 30, 1999)
Data
2nd 1st    2nd 1st 2nd 1st 
half of half of half of half of half of half of Total
Segments
1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999
Below -0.14 0 0 0 0 4 0 4
- 0 . 1 4  0000101
- 0 . 1 3  0000202
- 0 . 1 2  0000000
- 0 . 1 1  0000213
- 0 . 1 0  0000000
- 0 . 0 9  0100102
- 0 . 0 8  0000101
- 0 . 0 7  0000101
- 0 . 0 6  0000000
- 0 . 0 5  0001001
- 0 . 0 4  0001012
- 0 . 0 3  0000000
- 0 . 0 2  0000101
- 0 . 0 1  0011103
0.00 116 121 129 121 92 109 688
0.01 8 9 0 2 10 10 39
0 . 0 2  600039 1 8
0 . 0 3  0000011
0 . 0 4  0000101
0 . 0 5  0000303
0 . 0 6  0000404
0 . 0 7  0000101
Number of Days 130 131 130 126 128 131 776
Profit/Loss 0.37 0.23 0.03 -0.01 -0.63 0.39 0.39a steady downward trend.  VaR (HS: three years) also declined sharply through the
first half of 1998 because the extreme fluctuations of 1995 were removed from the
data used for the historical simulation.  Responding to market fluctuations, all VaRs
began to climb after the second half of 1998.  The most dramatic rise was observed
in the case of VaR (HS: one year).
Following the reverse rise in interest rates in the second half of 1998, profit/loss of
the strangle short strategy showed large fluctuations.  Consequently, both the fre-
quency and extent of excess loss over VaR were particularly high during this period
(see Table 3).
Table 3 can be used to undertake the backtesting required by the market-risk reg-
ulations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter referred to as
“market-risk regulations”).  The mandated backtesting counts the number of times
that daily trading profit/loss has exceeded VaR (at the 99% confidence level) over the
past year.  Four times or less is defined as constituting the “green zone,” five - nine
times as the “yellow zone,” and ten or more times as the “red zone.”  Financial insti-
tutions whose loss frequently exceed VaR are required to add to their capital.
23 Table
3 indicates that the strangle short strategy of this chapter would have put us in the
red zone during the second half of 1998.
24
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Figure 11 Risk Amount and Trends in Profit/Loss under Interest Rate Strangle Short
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23. Market-risk regulations require backtesting using daily profit/loss and VaR values for the latest twelve-month
period for each fiscal year.  The backtesting results are used in determining the plus-factors to be added to the
multiplication-factor of three.  The plus-factor is zero for the green zone and one for the red zone.  In the yellow
zone, the plus-factors are 0.4, 0.5, 0.65, 0.75, and 0.85 for frequencies of excess of 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively.
The market risk amount is obtained by multiplying the “multiplication-factor + plus-factor” (3 - 4) by the VaR
value for ten business days of holding and 99% confidence level.
24. The analysis of this chapter compares profit/loss of ten business days and VaR values of ten business days of hold-
ing.C. Implications
In this chapter, we have undertaken to empirically analyze risk measurement models
and to identify pertinent problems using the strangle short strategy as a test case.
Because the relation between option payoffs and underlying asset prices is non-linear,
the measurement of risks is more complicated than in the case of linear payoff.  
Risk measurement models are frequently based on the assumption of normal dis-
tribution or lognormal distribution.  Even in the case of the historical simulation
model, it is assumed that the distribution patterns of the historical data will be
repeated in the future.  Because risk measurement models must contain such internal
assumptions, they are inevitably susceptible to the type of model risks whereby actual
distributions differ from the assumed distribution.
VI. Practical Steps to Control Model Risks
In the foregoing chapters, we have examined model risks as separately defined for
pricing models and risk measurement models.  Our principal findings can be sum-
marized as follows.
-  Model Risks of Pricing Models
Definition: The risk arising from the use of a model which cannot accurately
express market prices, or which is not a mainstream model in the mar-
ket.
Where market prices are obtainable, risks are realized when the valuations of
internal pricing models are compared to actual market prices.  In such cases, hedging
discrepancies will lead to a gradual accumulation of real profits or losses.  On the
other hand, where market prices are unobtainable, risks are realized when the internal
pricing model is switched to the market’s dominant or mainstream model.
The sources of model risks in pricing models are generally as follows: (1) errors in
the premises and assumptions of the model; (2) errors in estimations of parameters
which cannot be directly observed such as default probability, correlation coefficients,
and other factors; (3) errors arising from discretization and other approximations;
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Table 3 Frequency of Excess Loss over VaR under Interest Rate Strangle Short
Strategy (October 1, 1996 - September 30, 1999)
Risk measurement 2nd half  1st half  2nd half  1st half  2nd half  1st half  Total
method of 1996 of 1997 of 1997 of 1998 of 1998 of 1999
VaR(3 years) Number of days exceeded 0 1 0 3 13 2 19
maximum excess -0.00 -0.05 -0.23 -0.09
VaR(1 year) Number of days exceeded 0 1 0 3 12 1 17
maximum excess -0.08 -0.05 -0.23 -0.03
VaR(HS:3 years) Number of days exceeded 0 0 0 3 9 1 13
maximum excess -0.05 -0.23 -0.01
VaR(HS:1 year) Number of days exceeded 0 1 0 3 8 0 12
maximum excess -0.08 -0.05 -0.20and (4) errors in market data.  The cases investigated in Chapter III correspond to
categories (1) and (2), while those of Chapter IV correspond to categories (3) and
(4).
Probably the majority of cases of losses resulting from model risks belong to cate-
gory (2), while the incidence of category (1) is thought to be quite low.  Finally,
model risks can be relatively easily controlled when market prices are obtainable at
high frequencies.
-  Model Risks of Risk Measurement Models
Definition: The risk of not accurately estimating the probability of future losses.
As seen in Section II. C and Section V, one type of model risk is attributable to
wrong premises concerning the distribution of underlying asset prices and the failure
to appropriately specify holding periods and confidence levels.  In such cases, VaR
cannot be accurately calculated and can lead to unexpectedly large losses.  On the
other hand, model risks can also take the  form of over-reaction, such as unnecessar-
ily large additions to the capital.
The VaR model, extensively used in the measurement of market risks, has the
problem of not being able to measure loss amounts located beyond the confidence
level.  Furthermore, in risk measurement models, logical elements of the entire
framework of the model, such as computational methods and the setting of risk fac-
tors for simplifying computational tasks, can also be a source of model risk.
The selection of practical steps to control model risks involves a trade-off between
the level of the model risk and the necessary cost of controlling the risk.  For
instance, overly rigorous examinations of models can possibly undermine the initia-
tive of the model development section in developing new products.  On the other
hand, if only very small positions are to be built up in a specific product, there is lit-
tle justification in spending large amounts on verifying the pertinent pricing model.
Furthermore, from the perspective of reducing computational burdens, a possible
approach would be to combine the use of a relatively simple model for day-to-day
risk control with a more refined model brought in for occasional position valuations
and the verification of the model itself.  Therefore, if a necessary minimum level of
steps has been properly installed, it could be possible to adopt a more flexible
approach to controlling model risks while taking account of such factors as type of
product, transaction policy, market conditions, and size of positions.
In the following sections, we shall examine what constitutes a necessary minimum
level of practical steps for the control of model risks.
A. Management System for Model Risks
In this section, we shall examine management systems for model risk, which may be
considered to be necessary for financial institutions. 
- Organization, Authorization, and Human Resources
The management of financial institutions must have a proper awareness of model
risks.  Moreover, this knowledge should not be treated merely as ancillary informa-
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must establish independent “model control sections” which function independently
of sections involved in the actual use of the models (such as the trading sections).
Personnel in charge of model control must investigate the various models being used
by the financial institution and should be authorized to issue directives for the revi-
sion and improvement of such models as needed.  Finally, personnel assigned to
model control must be able to understand the essence of the models and must be
fully capable of analyzing and verifying the models.
The financial institution cited in the case of the mark cap appearing in Section II.
B suffered large losses, although the mark cap is a very commonplace financial prod-
uct.  There is a possibility that this financial institution could have averted these
losses if the personnel in its model control section had been capable of verifying the
model and had been explicitly authorized to order the implementation of necessary
changes.
- Examination of Models
When a new model is developed by the trading section (hereinafter referred to as
the “front”) or the model development section, it is vitally important that it be exam-
ined by an independent model examination section.  The use of unexamined models
developed by the front or other sections can be extremely dangerous.  As such, an
examination section which is completely independent of the front must thoroughly
examine a new model, including such aspects as the theoretical justification (assump-
tions) of the model, the conformity of prices calculated by the model and actual mar-
ket prices, and hedging effectiveness.  Such examination systems and protocols
should be explicitly established in the internal rules of the financial institution.
The case involving the wrong calculation of long-term foreign exchange options cited
in Chapter III could have been avoided if the financial institution had instituted an
appropriate model examination system.  A properly manned examination section
could have prevented the inadvertent use of the BS model in pricing this option.
- Regular Review of Models
The continued use of a previously approved model without regular review can be
extremely dangerous.  This is because models must regularly undergo minor adjust-
ments to accurately reflect market changes, such as changes in the distribution pat-
tern of underlying asset prices.  Moreover, the various types of checks undertaken in
the examination process (conformity of calculated theoretical prices and actual mar-
ket prices, and hedging effectiveness) must also be regularly implemented.
The implementation of regular review could have averted the very large losses suf-
fered in the index swap case cited in Section II. A by calling for the necessary modifi-
cations in the model at an early stage.
- Communicating with the Front
As models are built to reflect the structure of the markets, model control staff
must have a full and up-to-date understanding of market developments.  Likewise,
they must be fully informed of the risk profile of the positions held by the front.  It is
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amount of information concerning the market.  Therefore, personnel in charge of
model control must maintain close and regular communications with the front, and
endeavor to stay abreast of market developments and the risk profile of the current
position.
For instance, as shown in Chapter V, positions under a strangle short strategy dis-
play non-linearity (optionality), and risk measurements must take this matter into
account.  Model control staff must have an up-to-date knowledge of the front’s cur-
rent positions and position management policies, in order to develop an awareness of
possible types of future risks and to build and manage appropriate risk measurement
models.  
B. Other Steps to Control Model Risk
Further to the model risk management systems discussed above, in this section we
shall consider other types of effective steps.  The specific steps examined below are:
reserves against loss, scenario analysis, and position limits.
- Reserves against Loss
Providing reserves against loss should constitute an effective step in controlling
the model risks of pricing models.
Let us consider cases in which the lattice method or Monte Carlo method is used
to calculate numerical values for pricing.  When using these methods, it is not neces-
sarily best to simply increase the number of segments or random number series.
25 An
alternative approach would be to achieve a certain level of precision in pricing which
satisfies the requirements of the financial institution, and to thereafter depend on
reserves to cope with possible calculated discrepancies.  For instance, in the normal
Monte Carlo method, it is known that, given N  random number series, calculated
error
26 will be in the order of  N 
-1/2 .  Therefore, if pricing is based on 10,000 ran-
dom number series, a viable step to control model risks would be to set up a reserve
equivalent to a few percent of the valuation amount.
27
The use of reserves is also a viable step in cases where market data on volatility
and other factors is unobtainable.  For instance, suppose that daily data on volatility
for a particular financial product is unobtainable while monthly data is available.  In
this case, reserves can be used to cover pricing errors on all days, excluding the day on
which volatility data is available (once a month).
Such responses would provide adequate provisions for the problems described in
Chapter IV, such as instability in current price resulting from too few segments under
the lattice method, or the unobtainability of volatility over a broad range.
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25. In the computational procedures of the lattice method and the Monte Carlo method, calculated results will gen-
erally approach the theoretical values as the number of segments or random number series reaches infinity.  The
problem, however, is that merely increasing the number of segments or random number series will only add to
the computational load and consume more time.  Speedy pricing is particularly important in trading functions.
As such, increasing the number of segments or random number series is not necessarily a viable solution.
26. See Tsuda (1995) pp. 91-113, and Kijima, Nagayama, and Omi (1996) pp. 143-155 for details of calculated dis-
crepancies in the Monte Carlo method.
27. 10,000 
-1/2 = 1%- Scenario Analysis
The front is always aware of current market conditions when using pricing mod-
els.  Therefore, proper provisions must be made for dramatic market shifts which
undermine the parametric foundations of the model.  One approach is to use histori-
cal data (scenarios) from past incidents of dramatic market shifts to observe how the
parameters of the model would have been affected in such cases, and to analyze the
trends in the discrepancies between market prices and prices calculated by pricing
model.
One of the problems of the standard VaR model is that the model does not take
account of the costs of closing a position.  Therefore, the question remains of how to
account for risk when holding very large positions, or positions in low-liquidity prod-
ucts.  In such cases, a viable approach would be to analyze various types of scenarios
with different assumptions concerning holding period and confidence level, and dif-
ferent patterns of fluctuation in risk factors.
In Chapter V, we showed that the level of VaR in the historical simulation
method can be significantly influenced by the data observation period.  Scenario
analysis provides an effective response to such problems which are endogenous to the
VaR model.
- Position Limits
One of the available methods for reducing model risk is the setting of position
limits.  For instance, position limits could be set for a product whose valuation is
highly complicated or which is subject to relatively high model risk.  Such limits
would be determined in light of the corresponding level of model risk.
An example of the application of this approach to pricing models is as follows.
Assume a pricing model for an infrequently traded financial product.  There exists
the possibility of discrepancies arising between the internal model and other models
used in the market.  A viable response in this case would be the setting of position
limits.  This approach can be used to avoid losses arising from discrepancies between
market and valuation prices, as described in Section II. A, II. B, and III.  Next, in the
case of risk measurement models, information from scenario analysis can be used in
determining position limits.  This approach can be used in reducing the risks which
may result from errors in the model’s assumed distribution of underlying asset prices,
as described in Section II. C and Section V.
Position limits can be managed more easily and at less cost than the process of
model review.  Therefore, position limits can be used as a flexible and effective com-
plement to the model review system.
VII. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented various cases in which actual model risks have been
realized and have used market data to empirically analyze the problems of the mod-
els.  Based on the implications of our empirical analysis, we have examined various
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Specifically, we have used examples of index swaps, mark cap, and the experiences
of LTCM to develop a general image of model risks.  From there, we have proceeded
to analyze long-term foreign exchange options, barrier options on stock prices, and a
strangle short strategy to identify some salient features of model risk.  Finally, we
have examined various steps and responses to model risks from a practical perspec-
tive.
In the area of qualitative steps to control model risks, we have investigated issues
pertaining to the reinforcement of risk management systems.  Our investigations
have covered the following concrete issues:  (1) organization, authorization, and
human resources; (2) examination of models; (3) periodic review of models; and (4)
maintenance of proper communications with the front.
In the area of quantitative steps to control model risks in pricing models, we have
proposed setting up reserves to allow for the pricing difference among different mod-
els, and instituting position limits based on such differences.  With regard to quanti-
tative steps to control model risks in risk measurement models, we have proposed
scenario analysis of various patterns in risk factor fluctuations, and instituting posi-
tion limits based on the information gained from scenario analysis.
Financial institutions can, by no means, afford to ignore model risks.  In the
future, there will be a growing need to implement various types of steps to control
model risks, including quantitative ones.
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Model Risk and Its ControlAPPENDIX 1: BLACK-SCHOLES TYPES
Black and Scholes (1973) assumed a lognormal distribution of stock price fluctua-
tions to derive the premiums of options on stocks as the underlying asset.  (BS
model)  Various other models built on the same framework as the BS model are gen-
erally referred to as BS types.




(Down and Out Put Option)
(A.2)
where:  
N (.) : cumulative density function of standard normal distribution,
S : underlying asset price,
K : strike price,
H : barrier price  (K > H) ,
T  : time to option maturity,
r  : risk-free domestic currency interest rate (for foreign exchange option),
q : risk-free foreign currency interest rate (for foreign exchange option), 
σ :  volatility of underlying asset price.
The price of the down and out put option can be derived by deducting the down
and in put option price from the normal put option price.  The option valuation for-
mulas of BS-type models assume that parameters, such as interest rates and volatility
of factors other than underlying asset prices, remain constant through maturity.
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28. See Hull (1997) pp. 457-489 for details of valuation formulas for exotic options.APPENDIX 2: AMIN-JARROW MODEL
The BS model assumes constant interest rates and volatility through maturity.
Because interest rates are less volatile than foreign exchange rates, the above assump-
tion does not pose a serious problem in the case of short-term options.  However,
interest-rate term structures and fluctuations cannot be ignored in the case of long-
term options.  As such, models for long-term options must take this factor into
account.  Amin and Jarrow (1991) developed a model which describes explicitly sto-
chastic fluctuations in two-country interest rates and exchange rates.  The AJ model
assumes that the forward interest rates of the two countries can be expressed in
HJM
29 type two-factor models, and that exchange rates can be expressed in four-fac-
tor models (two factors are the same as forward interest rates models) which assume
that the rate of return follows a normal distribution.  Finally, the AJ model expresses
the variance and covariance of interest and exchange rates in terms of the relation
between the functions of the volatility of each factor.
(A.3)
Subscripts  f and  d are foreign and domestic interests rates for forward interest
rates respectively, and:
fk (t ,T ) : forward interest rate at time  T  observed at time  t (k : d, f ),
ak  (t ,T ) : forward interest rate drift  (k : d, f ),
σki  (t ,T, fk (t ,T )) : forward interest rate volatility  (k : d, f ) (two-factor),
Sd  (t) : foreign exchange rate,
µd  (t) : foreign exchange rate drift,
δdi  (t) : foreign exchange rate volatility (four-factor) 
Wi  (t) : Wiener process
30,
where the following relation holds.
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29. The Heath-Jarrow-Morton model is an interest-rate term structure model.  See Heath, Jarrow, and Morton
(1992) for details.
30. It is assumed that the four Wiener processes in (A.3) are mutually independent.  Relations are established
between the foreign exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations in the following manner.  Of the four Wiener
processes for the foreign exchange rate, two are assumed to be the same for foreign and domestic forward interest
rates,  and one of the Wiener processes for the foreign and domestic forward interest rates is assumed to be the
same.Assuming that each volatility function is a deterministic function, the call option
price can be expressed as follows.
(A.4)
Unlike the BS model, the AJ model describes explicitly term structures and fluc-
tuations in the term structures of interest rates and volatility.  However, in this paper,
we assumed that interest rate and foreign exchange rate volatility, variance and covari-
ance remained constant through maturity, and derived our calculations from histori-
cal data.  This choice is based on the fact that the market for long-term foreign
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The behavior of underlying asset prices can be expressed as follows in the type of
world assumed in the BS model. 
dS = µc Sdt + σc SdW(t). (A.5)
Here,  S  stands for underlying asset price, and it is assumed that drift   µc and
volatility  σc  remain constant through maturity.  W(t)  is the Wiener process.  Cox,
Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) used a binomial tree to derive option prices, based on
the assumption that underlying asset prices exhibit this type of behavior.  While its
basic structure is the same as that of the binomial tree proposed by Cox and others,
the IBT model contains the following innovative feature.  Time is divided into sev-
eral smaller segments, and the behavior of underlying prices within each time seg-
ment is assumed to conform to the following geometric Brown movements.
dS = µ(t)Sdt + σ(S,t)SdW(t). (A.6)
The IBT model was developed to cope with interest rate term structures and other
market phenomena, such as smiles and skews.  Therefore, the functions  µ(t)  and
σ(S,t)  in (A.6) are determined to conform with option prices observed in the mar-
ket.  Furthermore, based on the following procedures, the normal binomial tree is
designed to yield a regular lattice structure as shown in Figure 4(a):  (1) the perstep
rate of increase in underlying asset prices is given as            ,  the perstep rate of
decline in underlying prices is given as              , and the drift in underlying asset
prices is given as a=e
µc∆t; and (2) the upward probability is given as  p=(a-d)/(u-d),
and the downward probability is given as  1–p.  On the other hand, the IBT model
uses forward induction to develop the lattice structures.  In other words, when mov-
ing from the starting-point asset price to the next step, the parameters  µ(t)  and
σ(S,t), which express the stochastic processes of the underlying asset price, are
defined so that the asset price in the next step conforms to the option price observed
in the market.
31 For this reason, the lattice structure differs from that of the standard
binomial tree and is skewed as shown in Figure 4(b).
Appendix Figure shows the distribution of underlying asset prices as deduced by the
IBT model using the market data as of September 30, 1999.
As can be seen from Appendix Figure, the implied distribution of underlying asset
prices derived from the IBT model does not conform with a lognormal distribution. 
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Appendix Figure  Implied Distribution of Underlying Asset Prices in IBT model
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